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To successfully conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention, it is essential to
establish a permanent United Nations verification agency. While the United States
currently opposes a United Nations role in multilateral arms control verification, successes
by the International Atomic Energy Agency in controlling nuclear weapons and the UN
Special Commission in the disarmament of Iraq demonstrate a need for the United States
to revise its position on this vital matter.
Potential benefits of a permanent verification agency presented in this thesis center
on the need for sharing heavy CWC verification costs, the unique challenges in monitoring
multinational treaties, and the advantages of an in-place body to address difficult
verification concerns prior to treaty implementation.
Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention will require tremendous financial
resources and enhance the need for organizational efficiency and economy. A permanent
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"If I am remembered for anything, it would be this, a
complete and total ban on chemical weapons." Those are the
words of President George Bush. 1 However, despite the
progress achieved thus far by the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, many critical issues remain unresolved
in the search for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.
Foremost among these issues is the need to develop a suitable
verification regime required to monitor universal adherence to
complete chemical disarmament. This thesis will argue that,
in order to successfully conclude a Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) , the United States should reverse its long-
held position against a United Nations role in multilateral
arms control verification.
Chemical weapons were once considered a capability
available only to the major military powers. Twenty years
ago, only five countries were estimated to possess chemical
weapons. However, chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive
and simple to manufacture. Today, U.S. officials believe that
as many as 23 countries currently possess or are attempting to
Remarks at the University of Toledo, Toledo, OH, 21
October 1988. Press Release, Office of the Vice-President.
acquire chemical weapons. Eight others may be considering the
acquisition of these weapons. 2 Despite the widespread
international condemnation of chemical warfare, Third World
conflicts have increasingly incorporated the use of chemical
weapons. Charges of chemical weapons use have been made
against at least nine countries in the last decade alone. 3
Recognizing the consequences of unchecked chemical weapons
proliferation, in June 1990, the United States and the Soviet
Union signed a bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement.
Following years of intense negotiations, exacting destruction
and verification procedures were agreed upon. However, this
bilateral progress does nothing to halt chemical weapons
proliferation and use throughout the Third World. Only a
verifiable treaty which bans the development, production,
possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons can contain
the global chemical weapons threat. Problems of verification
remain the single largest obstacle to the conclusion of such
a treaty.
A verification regime to monitor the CWC will presumably
require a large international inspectorate to carry out the
Steven R. Bowman, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation:
Issues for Congress," In CRS Review , Congressional Research
Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. The
Library of Congress, 19 July 1991, 1.
Ian Kemp, "Verification the Key to Global Chemical
Ban," Jane's Defense Weekly ," 7 October 1989, 704. and Tony
Banks, "Fighting to Stem the Tide: International Attempts to
Halt Proliferation of Chemical Weapons Have Met With Little
Success," Jane's Defense Weekly , 14 July 1990, 51.
conventions' inspection and monitoring provisions. That
international inspectorate does not currently exist. In the
past, numerous proposals were submitted to expand the role of
the United Nations to include verification of multilateral
treaties. Supporters argued that an international monitoring
and verification agency under UN auspices might help to
facilitate global and regional disarmament - chemical weapons
included. The United States is the only state within the
United Nations to oppose an expanded UN verification role. 4
Contrary to the U.S. vote, the United Nations may be the best
organization to handle the unique and complex arms control
challenges involved in multilateral verification duties.
Recently, the United States supported an important
verification role for the United Nations in monitoring the
post-war disarmament of Iraq. In doing so, the United States
acknowledged that some verification roles do exist for the
United Nations and that multilateral verification is
politically practical. This thesis will show that a permanent
multilateral verification regime under UN auspices is not only
necessary, but will offer certain advantages over the current
ad hoc method of treaty verification.
4 United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs,
The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1988 , Vol 13, 1989,
368.
B . METHODOLOGY
In an attempt to prescribe the nature and potential
benefits of a permanent United Nations verification agency,
this thesis will analyze two international bodies which were
created to administer specific verification roles. First, the
safeguards program of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) , designed to halt nuclear proliferation, is examined as
a possible institutional model for meeting the multilateral
verification requirements of a CWC . Secondly, the creation of
a Special UN Commission, mandated to locate and destroy Iraq's
chemical arsenal, is studied for possible application to the
CWC.
However, both of these examples, the IAEA and the UN
cease-fire commission, develop serious drawbacks when an
attempt is made to define conclusive parallels to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The safeguards system of the IAEA was
designed to detect the diversion of significant quantities of
fissionable materials and to deter the misuse of nuclear
material for military purposes. Unfortunately, many of the
chemical agents used in the production of chemical weapons
have alternate peaceful uses. Attempts to restrict access to
these chemicals are often viewed as unwarranted infringement
upon sovereign rights. Additionally, unlike nuclear weapons,
the technology required to manufacture chemical weapons is
readily available and export controls are not likely to be as
effective for a CWC.
The special UN commission monitoring the post-war
disarmament of Iraq may also display serious weaknesses when
evaluated as a model for a permanent UN agency. Iraq has been
forced to comply with requests of the commission as part of
its mandated cease-fire agreement. Most other inspection
regimes are based upon prior consent to intrusive verification
procedures. Most importantly, the threat of force to ensure
compliance will unlikely be included in a CWC
.
This thesis investigates the potential benefits of a
permanent UN verification agency by first looking at the
historical background of controlling chemical weapons. That
background reveals that verification provisions have been the
guaranteed stumbling block to all chemical disarmament
attempts. Proposals for a permanent UN verification agency
are discussed and reasons for current U.S. opposition to such
an agency are reviewed. Potential benefits as well as
possible drawbacks to a UN verification agency are then
introduced. Next, the safeguards program of the IAEA is
studied as a possible institutional model for halting chemical
proliferation, followed by an appraisal of the UN special
commission in Iraq. Comparing the similarities and
dissimilarities of these cases to the multilateral control of
chemical weapons determines what possible benefits a permanent
UN verification agency might play in the successful completion
of a Chemical Weapons Convention.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONTROLLING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A . PROL IFERAT ION
Current international law bans only the use of poison gas
and other chemical weapons in wartime. The testing,
manufacture, possession, or domestic use of chemical weapons
is legal. Additionally, chemical warfare (CW) agents are
comparatively simple to manufacture and their means of
delivery are within the military capabilities of many nations.
States not able to produce their own chemical weapons
indigenously can acquire these weapons from other CW states.
The effectiveness and relative ease of production led
Iranian leader Hashemi Rafsanjani to first describe chemical
weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb." 5 It is in the third
world that chemical weapons have proliferated the most.
Twenty years ago, only five countries were estimated to
possess chemical weapons. 6 Recent estimates of nations
possessing chemical weapons indicate that a growing number of
states have chosen to acquire this "poor man's atomic bomb."
Table 1 is a listing of 32 possible chemical weapon states.
Ian Kemp, "Verification the Key to Global Chemical
Ban," Jane's Defense Weekly , 7 October 1989, 704.
6 Kathleen C. Bailey, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation:
Reliable and Effective Control," Vital Speeches of the Day , 1
October 1988, 749.
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In March 1991, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Adm.
Thomas A. Brooks, noted the spread of chemical weapons
Bowman, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Issues for
Congress, " 1
.
"continues with little or no sign of abating." 8 In recent
years, unsubstantiated allegations of chemical weapons use
have been made against Vietnam, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Somalia,
Angola, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union. 9 Despite these
allegations, one nation has done more to raise the level of
international concern about chemical warfare than any other.
That nation is Iraq.
The Iraqi threat to use chemical agents during its
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and Iraq's confirmed use of
chemicals against its own Kurdish population in 1988, have
brought chemical warfare back into the international
spotlight. That spotlight has waned on and off since the
First World War.
B. GENEVA PROTOCOL, 17 JUNE 1925
The extensive use of chemical agents in World War I caused
some 1,3000,000 casualties, more than 100,000 of them
fatal. 10 Those tragic figures led to a strong condemnation
of the use of chemical agents and a global awareness for the
need to prevent future chemical warfare.
8 Michael Wines, "Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek
or Have Poison Gas," New York Times , 10 March 1991, 15.
9 Kemp, "Verification the Key, " 704 and Banks, "Fighting
to Stem the Tide," 51.
10 United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs,
The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1989 , Vol. 14, 1990,
235.
At the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the
International Traffic in Arms, the United States sought to
include a prohibition on the export of gases for use in war.
France suggested a separate protocol on the non-use of
poisonous gases, and bacteriological weapons were included at
the suggestion of Poland. 11 The Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, and Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, commonly known as
the Geneva Protocol, was signed on 17 June 1925.
While prohibiting the use of poisonous gases in war, many
nations declared that the protocol would cease to be binding
on them if their enemies, or allies of their enemies, failed
to respect the prohibitions of the protocol. The United
States helped negotiate and signed the treaty, but because of
strong lobbying against it, the U.S. Senate refused to approve
ratification. The protocol was withdrawn by President Truman
in 1947 following the Second World War. 12
During the Vietnam War, Communist countries strongly
criticized the U.S. use of tear gas and chemical herbicides.
The United States, which had always supported and observed the
principles of the protocol, was the only major military power
still not party to it. On 19 August 1969, President Nixon
11 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the
Negotiations
,
(Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1990), 10.
12 Ibid., 10-11.
resubmitted the protocol to the Senate. He reaffirmed the
U.S. position that the protocol did not apply to riot-control
agents and herbicides. Additionally, the United States
reserved the right to retaliate with gas if an enemy violated
the protocol. The Ford Administration finally obtained Senate
ratification, and the Geneva Protocol received Presidential
ratification on 22 January 1975. 13
The 1925 Geneva Protocol contains no provisions for
verification or enforcement. Recognizing the inherent
weaknesses of a treaty lacking in verification or compliance
procedures, the international community has continued to
strive for means to strengthen the protocol.
C. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, 10 APRIL 1972
In 1948, the United Nations Commission for Conventional
Armaments defined chemical and biological weapons as weapons
of mass destruction. The first UN resolution devoted
specifically to chemical and biological warfare came in 1966,
and was subsequently addressed by the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament in 1968.
The Soviet Union and other Eastern European States
supported a convention that combined biological and chemical
weapons. They argued that both weapon types had been treated
together in the Geneva Protocol and should continue to be
13 Ibid., 15
10
linked in future disarmament agreements. Those states
believed that a separate approach to biological weapons would
not only delay a ban on chemical weapons but might intensify
the chemical arms race. 14
The United States favored separate treaties, though it did
not consider the prohibition of chemical weapons to be any
less important than a ban on biological weapons. Biological
weapons were of limited military use, and the United States
believed a ban on biological weapons alone could be achieved
at an earlier date. Unlike biological weapons, chemical
weapons had been used in modern warfare. The United States
maintained that chemical weapon states would be reluctant to
give up CW capability without strict verification assurances
that other states were not developing or stockpiling chemical
weapons. Since binding verification provisions were not
included in any of the draft conventions, the United States
believed a ban on chemical weapons was not feasible.
In 1971, the Soviets reversed their position on the
separation of biological and chemical weapons. One year
later, on 11 April 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction was
opened for signature. The United States approved final
ratification of The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) on 26
14 United Nations, Disarmament Yearbook 1989, 236
11
March 1975. By the end of 1989, 111 States were parties to
the BWC. 15
Like the Geneva Protocol proposed five decades earlier,
the BWC was extremely deficient in verification and compliance
arrangements. Article V of the BWC encouraged parties to
"consult one another and to cooperate in solving any
problems," and Article VI specified that states suspecting a
violation "may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of
the United Nations." 16 These vague and ineffectual
verification clauses led to growing international awareness
for strengthened verification provisions in an eventual ban on
chemical weapons.
D. EVOLUTION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Immediately after agreement to delete chemical weapons
from the proposed draft on the Prohibition of Chemical and
Bacteriological Weapons, chemical weapons began to be debated
independently by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) . From
1972 onwards, numerous proposals were submitted, including
complete texts of draft conventions. Differences over
verification provisions remained the core of most debate.
In 1972, the Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty with
wording identical to the convention on biological weapons.
15 Ibid., 237.
16 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control
and Disarmament, 134.
12
The draft treaty was not considered acceptable for two basic
reasons. First, it ignored the differences between chemical
and biological weapons, a subject of years of UN discussion.
Second, a majority of states believed that fundamental
questions of verification had to be addressed to reach a new
agreement limiting chemical warfare. 17
Parallel to multilateral negotiations conducted by the
Conference on Disarmament, the United States and Soviet Union
conducted bilateral negotiations. Prompted by the Moscow
summit of 1974, the superpowers began these discussions in
1976. Common understandings were reached over the
classification of chemical agents, declaration and destruction
of stockpiles, and a basic time schedule for implementation.
Additionally, both sides supported the establishment of a
consultative committee to handle technical issues, data
exchange, and verification provisions. 18 However, Soviet
resistance to on-site inspections remained the most
significant obstacle to concluding a bilateral Chemical
Weapons Agreement (CWA). 19 In 1980, the United States
A. Jack Ooms , "Chemical Weapons: Is Revulsion a






19 V.L. Israelyan, Soviet delegate at the Committee on
Disarmament on March 31, 1981 and March 25, 1982 in
Verification: the Soviet Stance, Its Past, Present and
Future , United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
(UNIDIR/90/34 1990) : 82.
13
terminated the apparently stalled talks in protest of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 20
Multilateral talks were strengthened in 1981 when an ad
hoc working group of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was
established to deal specifically with the chemical weapons
question. In 1984, the United States submitted a proposed
full text of a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. 21 That draft "rolling text," with brackets and gaps
to indicate areas of disagreement, provides the basic text for
the current Chemical Weapons Convention.
A breakthrough on verification procedures occurred on 15
January 1986 when the Soviets reversed their stance on
intrusive verification. Conference on Disarmament document
649, submitted by General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, stated in part:
"We are prepared to ensure timely notification of the
location of plants producing chemical weapons and the
cessation of such production, and are ready to start
working out procedures for destroying the relevant
industrial facilities, and also to proceed, soon after the
convention enters into force, to destroy the stockpiles of
chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out
under strict control, including international on-site
inspection . " 22
20 Ooms , "Is Revulsion a Safeguard?," 161.
United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs,
The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1984 , Vol. 9, 1985:
Appendix VII, 559.
22 United Nations, United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, Verification: the Soviet Stance, Its
Past, Present and Future (UNIDIR/90/34 1990): 83.
14
As a result of that reversal regarding inspections upon
request, the Soviet Union opened the way for further progress
in the elaboration of the draft rolling text by the Conference
on Disarmament. Broad verification provisions now included:
• the need for an international inspectorate to carry out
the convention's inspection and monitoring provisions;
• international on-site verification of declared stockpiles;
• procedures for using remote monitoring instruments;
• requirements to verify destruction of chemical weapons
producing facilities (though exact methods were not agreed
upon) . 23
However, many issues remained unresolved, including the
design of an international organization to carry out the
verification duties outlined above. Additionally, many
technical deficiencies existed in the development of necessary
instruments and monitoring devices required to monitor a CWC
.
The exacting details of the verification process have produced
the greatest obstacles to concluding a final agreement
Present multilateral verification discussions remain centered
on inspection procedures and the organizational and procedural
structure of the body that will administer the convention. 24
Ibid., 84-85. and Lewis A. Dunn, "Chemical Weapons
Arms Control: Hard Choices for the Bush Administration,"
Survival
, (May/June 1988): 212.
24 Steven R. Bowman, "Chemical Weapons: U.S. Arms Control
Negotiations and Destruction, " CRS Issues Brief , updated 19
July 1991, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division, The Library of Congress, 1991, 8-9.
15
Fortunately, bilateral chemical weapons talks have fared
better than the multilateral ones. The CW discussions between
the Superpowers resumed after the November 1985 summit when
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev submitted a
joint statement reaffirming their commitment to a Chemical
Weapons Convention. 25 Successful progress was demonstrated
in September 1989 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. USSR Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker signed a memorandum of understanding that outlined two
stages of a Superpower experiment in controlling chemical
weapons. In the first stage, sides would exchange general
data on chemical weapon capabilities and conduct visits to
specified military and civilian facilities. The second stage
would then progress to the exchange of detailed information
and allow for on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of
exchanged data. 26
On 1 June 1990, the United States and Soviet Union signed
a Chemical Weapons Agreement covering the production of
chemical weapons and the destruction of current stockpiles.
Both nations agreed for the need to continue verification
procedure trials, including test challenge inspections of non-
declared sites. 27 The CWA provided for destruction
25 United Nations, Disarmament Yearbook 1989, 238-39




technology and costs to be shared, but speculation now exists
that the Soviet Union has requested financial assistance or
U.S. participation in building Soviet destruction
facilities. 28 Nevertheless, convergence of views on
verification procedures by the United States and Soviet Union
have been viewed as a significant impetus for the CWC
negotiations
.
However, many developing nations continue to fear
restrictions on their civilian chemical industries as an
undesired by-product of a CW ban. Others, including China,
India, and Brazil, remain adamantly opposed to on-site
inspections upon demand. 29 Efforts to move forward the
Chemical Weapons Convention continue to be hampered by
intransigent unilateral positions. "Glacial progress" are the
words of one State Department officer used to describe CWC
accomplishments by the Conference on Disarmament. He further
elaborated:
"That the Conference on Disarmament has been able to
accomplish anything is a political miracle... Attempting
to get such a politically contradictory group to agree on
the calendar date is an accomplishment akin to
successfully herding chickens." 30
28 Ibid., 3.
29 Kemp, "Verification the Key, " 704
30 David T. Jones, "Eliminating Chemical Weapons: Less





It is widely held that an adequate verification system
remains the key problem to concluding a CWC. 31 Perhaps it is
time to remove the verification issues from the politically
charged Conference on Disarmament. Proposals calling for the
establishment of a permanent international verification regime
are not new. However, reasons for revisiting the subject seem
clear, based on the "glacial progress" demonstrated over the
past two decades by failure to achieve a verifiable Chemical
Weapons Convention.
31 United Nations, Disarmament Yearbook 1989, 244
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION AGENCY
The concept of UN participation in multilateral arms
control treaties is firmly rooted in the experiences of the
United Nations. Though only minor references to disarmament
were included in its 1945 Charter, nearly every major UN
General Assembly Resolution dealing with general and complete
disarmament has cited the need for effective international
control
.
The United States currently opposes a role for the United
Nations in the field of verification. Until the mid-1980s,
the Soviet Union also held major objections to international
control mechanisms. However, the Soviet Union now supports an
international verification agency under the auspices of the
United Nations. This chapter examines the evolution of the UN
role in arms control verification and looks at changing
superpower attitudes on that verification role. The basis for
current U.S. opposition is reviewed and possible prerequisites
for the United States to support the concept of a United
Nations verification agency (UNVA) are presented. The chapter
concludes with the potential benefits and drawbacks of a UN
verification agency.
19
A. GENESIS OF THE UN VERIFICATION AGENCY CONCEPT
The Baruch plan was the first major arms control proposal
made to the United Nations which included international
verification provisions. Proposed by the United States in
1946, procedures were outlined for the control and eventual
destruction of nuclear weapons. The plan called for the
creation of an International Atomic Development Authority to
control all atomic energy activities. 32
The Baruch plan was bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union
and regarded as an unwarranted infringement on national
sovereignty. The Soviets argued that, on the pretext of
establishing international control, the outcome would be
nothing more than a form of legalized international espionage.
The Soviet counterproposal was a commitment to nuclear
disarmament ahead of any form of international control. The
Baruch plan was never implemented and the pattern of East/West
differences over verification and control systems continued
for the next four decades. 3
Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, eds
.
, A
Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (Dunn
Loring, Va . : T.N. Dupuy Associates, 1973), 301-08.
33 Examples of reciprocal charges that the West favored
"control without disarmament" and that the East favored
"disarmament without control" are President Eisenhower's 1955
Open Skies Proposal and the 1961 bilateral Statement of Agreed
Principles. For complete texts see Statement by President
Eisenhower at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government:
Aerial Inspection and Exchange of Military Blueprints, July
21, 19 55. In Dupuy, Documentary History of Arms Control , 380-
81 and Report of the United States and the Soviet Union to the
Sixteenth General Assembly on the Results of the Bilateral
20
However, long-held Soviet objections to international
verification regimes took a momentous shift after Mikhail
Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev's article, "The Realities
and Guarantees of a Secure World, " declared Soviet support
for a UN role in arms control verification. Submitted as an
official UN document in September 1987, the article stated:
It seems to us that the aim of strengthening trust and
mutual understanding under the UN auspices, it is possible
to establish a mechanism for wide-ranging international
verification of compliance with agreements aimed at
reducing international tension and limiting armaments, and
for monitoring the military situation in regions of
conflict. The mechanism would operate by using various
verification forms and methods for collecting information
and its prompt submission to the UN. 34
One year later, at the Third UN Special Session on
Disarmament, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze formally
proposed the creation of an international monitoring and
verification agency under the auspices of the United
Nations. 3 ' Other proposals on verification of disarmament
agreements, submitted by France, Canada, and the Netherlands,
Talks: Agreed Statement of Principles, September 20, 1961. In
Dupuy, Documentary History of Arms Control , 471.
34 United Nations Document A/42/574 in UNIDIR,
Verification: The Soviet Stance , 112.
The Soviet proposal was included in a paper,
"Establishment of an international verification mechanism
under the auspices of the United Nations." That document, A/S-
15/AC.1/15, was a combined effort of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and the USSR. In United Nations, Disarmament Yearbook 1988 ,
71-72.
21
also focused on multilateral verification by a United Nations
group of experts. 36
Concurrent with verification efforts at the Third UN
Special Session on Disarmament, the forty-third session of the
UN General Assembly considered three draft resolutions on the
item "Verification in all aspects." Largely due to the
negotiation efforts of Sweden, the originator of two of the
proposals, the three drafts were merged into one single text.
That final draft resolution, entitled "Study on the role of
the United Nations in the field of verification, " was co-
sponsored by 35 countries.
Sweden made clear that one of the reasons for its proposal
was the fact that states had different capabilities in terms
of national technical means of verification and international
verification arrangements could help even out such
differences. Based upon the central role played by the United
Nations in the sphere of disarmament, Sweden believed that the
United Nations should have a corresponding role in the field
of verification. 3 Other sponsors noted that the United
Nations could make significant contributions in the field of






On 7 December 1988, the United States cast the single
negative vote for Resolution 43/81 B, entitled "Study on the
role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The
final recorded vote was 150 to 1, with no abstentions. 3 *
B. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO ROLE OF THE UN IN VERIFICATION
In explaining its negative vote, the United States
expressed the view that verification arrangements:
must be developed and agreed upon by the negotiating
parties. It did not see how the Secretary-General could
undertake an in-depth study on the role of the United
Nations in verification in the abstract, in the absence of
any parameters that specific agreements might provide for
such a role in individual cases, and how, in the
circumstances, the participants in the study could provide
any specific recommendations for future action by the
United Nations in that field. 39
That statement was the formal U.S. position. It was far
different from the U.S. position stated twenty-five years
earlier in the Statement Agreed of Principles which supported
an International Disarmament Organization within the framework
of the United Nations.
In those twenty-five years, the United States had
increasingly relied upon treaty-specific verification
provisions as the most effective means of verifying treaty




was a matter for states directly concerned and was most
effective when it was treaty specific. Further, that same
rationale was embodied in principle 13 of the Disarmament
Commission's draft principles. Outside organizations could be
involved in verification agreements only at the request, and
with explicit approval, of all participating parties. 40
However, in casting the single negative vote against
Resolution 43/81 B, the United States ignored growing
awareness within the international community of the
significant role that multilateral verification might play in
multinational arms control agreements. By its negative vote,
the United States refused to even investigate the political or
financial realities of an expanded role for the United Nations
in the field of verification.
More candid reasons for the U.S. position were expressed
by Richard S. Williamson, the U.S. Alternate Representative to
the third UN Special Session on Disarmament. His statement
before Working Group II of the special session revealed deep-
seated U.S. resistance to any expansion of UN activities in
the field of disarmament. He stated:
Over the years the United Nations has accumulated an
elaborate - some would say excessive - structure of
activities and mechanisms ostensibly designed to promote
and encourage the arms control and disarmament process.
Yet by its very nature, this structure has become unwieldy





Consistent with our views on the need to streamline the
disarmament machinery, the United States does not perceive
any need to create new, duplicative UN mechanisms in this
field. We are aware of proposals from some member states
for the establishment of new organs, such as a UN
verification mechanism and an international outer space
inspectorate. I wish to reiterate that my delegation will
continue to oppose such proposals on both financial and,
more importantly, substantive grounds. 41
Although Mr. Williamson declared that U.S. resistance was
based primarily on substantive and secondly on financial
grounds, his statement occurred at a time when the United
States was nearly $550 million in debt to the United Nations.
Background events which led to that debt revealed broad-based
U.S. displeasure with the United Nations. Conceivably, that
dissatisfaction was exhibited when the United States was the
single nation to oppose an investigation into the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification.
One method by which the United States had previously
sought to influence the United Nations was through the
selective withholding of UN funds. The selective withholding
of U.S. funds began in September 1983, when the Senate adopted
a proposal to drastically cut the United States contribution
to the United Nations. By far the largest contributor to the
UN budget at 25 percent, the United States sought reforms to
halt the seemingly unending growth in UN expenditures. The
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The
United Nations and Disarmament, Current Policy 1077
(Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1988) by Richard S. Williamson,
statement before Working Group II of the UN Special Session on
Disarmament, New York City, 7 June, 1988, 2.
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sponsor of the amendment, Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum,
Republican of Kansas, proposed cuts amounting to $500 million
over four years, roughly half the United States contributions.
The Senator explained that her amendment was:
not motivated by pique at the United Nations over any one
vote or situation in recent years... what it means is
simply that the United Nations will have to look to its
budget, just as we are struggling to look at our budget.
It is as simple as that. 4 ^
Despite the budget argument for the selective withholding
of UN funds, the Kassebaum amendment was proposed at a time of
growing politicization within the United Nations. On 19
September 1983, only three days prior to the Kassebaum
amendment, Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, frustrated deputy
chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations, invited Soviet and
other UN delegates to leave the United States if they were not
happy with host country hospitality. In fact he said, "we
will be at dockside bidding you a farewell as you set off into
the sunset." 4 ' Following Mr. Lichenstein ' s remarks, Senator
Steven D. Symms , Republican of Idaho, wrote to President
Reagan saying he was
:
convinced that most Americans are tired of playing host to
our enemies and critics who abuse our hospitality, using
the United Nations as a platform for insults and
Congress, Senate, Proceedings and Debates, 98th.
Cong., 1st. sess., Congressional Record (22 September 1983),
vol. 129, no. 123, S 12732-33.
43 Ibid., S12733.
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propaganda and a headquarters for espionage, while we pick
up the lion's share of the UN's cost.
I hope you will consider awarding Ambassador Lichenstein
a Medal of Freedom. 44
It can be argued that the Kassebaum amendment was passed
more for its political message than its actual intent of UN
reform. The United States, discontent with the rhetorical
Eastern and third world voting blocs, pursued both political
and fiscal strategies to bring about desired improvements to
that organization. Accordingly, it is quite possible that
initial U.S. resistance to a UNVA was based more on the
political and financial climate which existed in the United
Nations during the late 1980s, and less on declared
"substantive grounds."
C. PREREQUISITES FOR UNVA TO BECOME SUPPORTABLE BY THE U.S.
The United States argument against a UN verification role
is divided into two levels: one substantive and the other
political. The argument that the UN machinery in the field of
disarmament needs to be streamlined and made cost effective is
substantive. Calls for the General Assembly to reduce the
rhetorical and argumentative texts on disarmament, though
arguably substantive, are generally a political consideration.
On the political side of the argument, much progress has
been made by the United Nations in combating the factional
44 Ibid., S12734
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tension that has highlighted much of its 45-year history.
Current historic political events in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have placed East-West relations on a new
foundation. The revitalized concept of a modern
interdependent world requires a fresh look at the ideal of
internationalism and international organizations in general.
In recent years, the United Nations has demonstrated that
it can achieve multilateral solutions to complex global issues
and difficult political problems. However, the argument that
because the United Nations is a more successful organization
in 1991 than it was in the past does not automatically
translate to the need for the United States to support a UN
verification agency. Substantive issues must be examined to
determine what benefits a UNVA might have over current
verification methods. One substantive issue pertains to the
increasingly important political side of arms control verifi-
cation requirements.
As Henry Kissinger once stated, "the major weakness of
United States diplomacy has been the insufficient attention
given to the symbolic aspects of foreign policy." 45 By
reversing its position against a UN verification agency, the
United States would demonstrate the emerging importance of
that international body and position itself as a proactive
Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
,
(Norton, 1957) ,61. In Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense ,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 46.
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influence in the design and proper use of such an organi-
zation .
In addition to the political prestige gained by this
policy reversal, an effective UN verification agency could
offer other important advantages over current ad hoc methods
of treaty verification. However, potential drawbacks to a
permanent UN verification agency must also be considered.
D. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES /BENEFITS OF A PERMANENT UNVA
1. Verification Costs
Compliance and verification expenditures are divided
into two categories - one time costs and recurring costs. One
time costs include: research and development, equipment
procurement, initial planning and management, baseline
inspections and elimination costs. These costs can be
incurred over a ten year period, but are usually concentrated
in the first three. Recurring costs include: short-notice and
suspect-site quota inspections, elimination costs, equipment
procurement and maintenance, and management and oversight.
Recurring costs begin the first year of implementation and can
run indefinitely. 46
Compliance and on-site estimated costs for the
bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement range from $45 million to
46 Congress, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Costs of
Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties (CBO
Study J-932-38, September 1990), 38.
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$220 million in one-time costs and from $15 million to $70
million in annual costs. Those figures for CWA verification
are deceivingly low because weapon elimination costs are not
included. The destruction of older unitary chemical weapons
was mandated and separately funded by Congress beginning in
the mid-1980s. 47 Total U.S. chemical weapon elimination
costs, initially estimated at $3.7 billion, have recently been
increased to $6.5 billion, payable over the next seven or
eight years . 48
While detailed verification provisions of a multilateral
Chemical Weapons Convention remain to be agreed upon, some
verification costs can be estimated from the CWA example. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that there are roughly
three to five times as many chemical factories worldwide as
there are in the United States and Soviet Union combined.
Thus, costs of verifying a CWC might be three to five the cost
of the bilateral CWA. That assumption is based on
proportional numbers of inspectors, inspections, and similar
equipment to verify treaty provisions. 49
47 Ibid., 37-39.
Bowman, "Chemical Weapons: Negotiations and
Destruction, " 3
.
Another approach used by the CBO, which results in a
slightly higher estimate, is to use the CFE and START drafts
as a basis for CWC estimates. Assuming inspections of only 1
to 10 percent of plants capable of producing chemical agents,
inspection costs might run to hundreds of million dollars each
year. Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Costs of
Verification, 40-41.
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Experts from the U.S. chemical industry have
acknowledged that the technology probably exists to verify a
chemical weapons ban. However, those same experts estimate
that the agency's technical secretariat and lab support staff
must maintain a 1:1 ratio of staff to inspectors to manage the
vast amount of collected data. Annual operating expenses for
such an international authority are estimated in the $200
million to $300 million range. 50
In summary, the cost of chemical weapons verification,
now limited to a CWA only, is very high. When added together
with compliance and on-site inspection costs required for
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) , Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) , Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT) , and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) , these
verification costs become staggering. For the United States
alone, one-time verification costs range from $645 million to
$3.03 billion and from $190 million to $660 million in annual
costs. 51 Multilateral CWC verification costs will increase
those numbers even higher.
Clearly an in-place UN verification agency might help
defray many of the start-up, technical, and administrative
costs through reduced duplication of effort and, when
50 Kyle B. Olson, "The U.S. Chemical Industry Can Live
With A Chemical Weapons Convention, " Arms Control Today
,
(November 1989) ,24.




possible, the sharing of collected data between various
treaties. Overhead costs of the agency could be shared by all
UN members. Treaty-specific costs would be divided
proportionately among parties as agreed upon during the treaty
negotiation process. 5 ^ Additionally, spiraling research and
development costs, representing almost 10% of the total costs
in monitoring treaty compliance, 5 enhance the need for
sharing the burden of multilateral treaty verification costs.
2. Monitoring Treaty Compliance
Some skeptics have argued that a treaty banning
chemical weapons defies any degree of verif iability
.
54 Based
on the sheer quantity of chemical substances which must be
monitored, many which have legitimate alternate purposes,
those critics may have a convincing case. The opposing
argument emphasizes that the security gains from an admittedly
imperfect treaty outweigh the consequences of unchecked
chemical weapons proliferation. Neither argument is 100%
conclusive
.
A. Walter Dorn, "The Case for a United Nations
Verification Agency, " IEEE Technology and Society Magazine , 9
(December 1990/January 1991), 19-21.
John D. Morrocco, "Verification Raises Cost,
Technology Concerns," Aviation Week & Space Technology
, (6
August 1990) , 45.
54 Kenneth Adelman, "Why Verification is More Difficult





Recently, in a reversal of previous demands for
anywhere, anytime, and no right of refusal chemical
inspections, the United States moderated its position on the
need for so-called challenge inspections. Under the old
proposals, countries could visit any plants or laboratories
under the pretext that they understood chemical weapons were
being stored there. With the revised U.S. plan, inspectors
could effectively be barred from specified plants and given
only limited access to others. The turnabout by Washington
was based on the need to protect sensitive military
technologies from international inspectors . s ' The CWC
negotiators must now decide how to incorporate these changes
into the final draft and maintain support for the convention.
Whatever the final decision, the verification regime which
eventually monitors the CWC will be bound by those
verification decisions.
Similar procedures would apply to a permanent UN
verification agency that might be called upon to perform
certain verification duties. Treaty-specific verification
clauses would delineate that agency's involvement as specified
by the negotiating parties. Each treaty would be overseen by
its signatories with assigned verification duties carried out
by the UNVA. Again, limits to those duties would be
determined by the negotiating parties.
Paul Lewis, "U.S. Now Prefers Limited Inspection of
Chemical Arms," The New York Times , 14 August 1991, p. A5
.
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Additionally, an international verification agency is
not intended to replace the procedures currently used in many
areas of bilateral arms control verification. Parties to a
treaty will remain free to negotiate bilaterally or regional-
ly, utilizing the UNVA only for verification provisions and
treaties that they deem appropriate.
3. Speed in Treaty Implementation
An often overlooked advantage to a UN verification
agency is the role that such an agency could play before a
treaty is written. Concerns over verification issues could be
addressed before and during treaty negotiations and agency
experts might guide negotiators in the use of previously
developed verification technology or in the drafting of
specific provisions. 5,1 This "corporate knowledge" aspect
would be most relevant to treaties that might not involve the
superpowers
.
Beyond the consultative assistance to negotiators,
treaty ratification might become easier if member states would
be assured that international experts had already provided
their inputs and that such a verification agency was in place
and ready to function as soon as a treaty was implemented. 57
The disadvantages of not having such an agency is aptly
56 Dorn, "The Case for a UN Verification Agency, " 19
57 Ibid.
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demonstrated by the difficult 20-year verification process of
the CWC.
In a purely domestic approach, the United States has
realized the benefits of an umbrella organization to study
verification work and investigate requirements of pending arms
control agreements. In 1990, the Verification Technology
Working Group was established as a subcommittee to the Arms
Control Policy Committee within the National Security Council.
Members of the group include representatives of the State
Department, Energy Department, Defense Department, ACDA, and
the intelligence agencies. 58 These organizations work
together to prepare the United States for the next generation
of verification challenges. The framework of this interagency
approach can be expanded to confront the increasingly interna-
tional problem of how much verification can be accepted and
how to best implement that verification.
4. Dispute Resolution
The final advantage to a UN verification agency comes
in the area of dispute resolution, and it is important to note
its position relative to the others. Dispute resolution is
considered of little benefit because of a lack of an
international enforcement mechanism. The intent of this
proposed UN verification agency is not to create a judicial-
Breck W. Henderson, "Arms Control Pacts May Outpace
Advances in Verification Technology, " Aviation Week & Space
Technology
, (6 August 1990), 51.
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like commission to rule on suspected arms control violations.
By utilizing a UN agency to resolve compliance problems, the
political importance of give-and-take negotiations would be
emphasized. In order for satisfactory resolutions of
compliance problems to occur, diplomacy must handle disputes
once an arms control agreement enters into force. 59
A UN verification agency, comprised of highly
qualified experts in the field of disarmament and arms
control, would provide the best forum for ensuring a
continuing consultative process between parties. 60 The
credibility of such a consultative commission might persuade,
pressure or otherwise convince an errant treaty member that
its best interests lie within the framework of the treaty and
not in unilateral measures, including possible treaty break
out. Additionally, this commission could help distinguish
overtly political accusations from technical issues by
establishing priorities for examining officially filed treaty
violations. And once again, the "corporate knowledge"
developed by the resolution branch of this multinational
verification agency could be used to structure verification
provisions of future arms limitation treaties.
Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," Foreign
Policy , No. 45, (Winter 1981-82): 39.
Allan S. Krass, Verification - How Much is Enough?
,
SIPRI, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), 254.
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E. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS TO A UN VERIFICATION AGENCY
The United States government believes there are sufficient
UN bodies to consider the broad range of existing arms control
and disarmament agreements. To accord disarmament roles to
other bodies would detract from the work of the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament. 61 As Mr. Williamson cautioned the
1988 UN Special Session on Disarmament: "to contribute to a
more constructive atmosphere for the conduct of arms control
and disarmament negotiations, we must be realistic and avoid
divisive proposals and overly ambitious concepts which are
clearly not susceptible to consensus." 62 Obviously, more
valid and tangible objections to a UN verification role exist
and should be examined.
In the budget-conscious United Nations, almost any new
project that involves large financial expenditures is met with
resistance. Many questions regarding a UNVA have arisen, such
as: Who will fund the agency? Who will participate in the
agency and staff the inspectorate? Where will the
verification labs and headquarters of the agency be located?
None of these questions are easy, yet neither are they
insurmountable. Once the political will to establish a UNVA
has been attained, these funding issues can be addressed in
earnest. However, it is important to remember that the






sharing of collected verification data, personnel, and
resources can be more cost-effective than current ad hoc
methods of treaty verification.
A second possible objection to a UNVA involves the manner
in which a body of sovereign states could effectively manage
the collection, evaluation and use of sensitive verification
information. 63 Many argue that a UN verification agency
would prove inefficient and too bureaucratic for the task. 64
Again, it must be emphasized that a UN verification agency
need not begin on a grand scale. Just as verification
provisions between the superpowers have evolved and matured
over time, the same can be expected of an international
verification regime.
Multilateral treaty verification requires that treaty
members begin to participate in the verification process to
some extent. 65 That does not mean that advanced verification
procedures, such as, no-notice on-site inspections, rights of
overflight, in-country seismic monitoring and semi -permanent
portal monitoring facilities will be incorporated into
James A. Schear, "Verifying Arms Agreements: Premises,
Practices, and Future Problems," in The Verification of Arms
Control Agreements , ed. Ian Bellany and Coit D. Blacker
(London: Frank Cass and Company, 1983), 92.
64 Pamela Pohling-Brown and Brigette Sauerwein, "Tools
and Techniques of Verification, " International Defense Review
,
24 (May 1991) : 408.
Ivan Oerlich, "The Changing Rules of Arms control
Verification: Confidence is Still Possible," International
Security vol. 14, no . 4 , (Spring 1990): 181.
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multilateral treaties overnight. A UNVA would likely begin by
using less intrusive, cooperative verification measures.
Those measures might include multilateral risk-reduction
centers, the voluntary exchange of treaty-specified data, the
use of unmanned "black boxes," or the tagging of military
hardware
.
Concern over spying is a third possible objection to a
multilateral verification agency. Verification uncertainties
will always be inherent in multilateral treaties which involve
diverse military organizations and varied political doctrines.
The United Nations is a time-tested organization, well
experienced in handling both sensitive data and difficult
issues of national sovereignty. The protection of classified
military technologies and sensitive commercial or economic
information must be included in the proper design and
operation of any UN verification system.
F. SUMMARY
Today, the international political climate is markedly
different from the period when the United States voted against
examining a verification role for the United Nations. In his
1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, George
Bush acknowledged that the United Nations is "beginning to act
as it was designed, freed from superpower antagonisms that
often frustrated consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic
39
ant i -Americanism that so weakened its credibility." 66 In the
coming decade, the United Nations will likely play a more
prominent role in handling complex global issues than any time
in its past. Recognizing the emerging political importance of
that organization, the United States should review its
previous opposition to a UN role in multilateral verification.
However, verification of large multilateral treaties
presents a unique challenge to arms control regimes. The
improved political prestige of the United Nations does not
necessarily guarantee a constructive UN role in the field of
arms control verification. Current multilateral arms control
proposals, including the elimination of chemical weapons,
require that potential benefits of a permanent UN verification
regime be fully explored. Though several advantages of a
permanent UNVA have been presented, potential drawbacks will
require special attention in the proper design of a permanent
verification regime.
The complex nature of verifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention is one reason to investigate past UN verification
experiences. One often-praised UN verification agency, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has accumulated
over three decades of verification experience in a
multilateral arms control regime. Similarities between the
George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States
,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1991), 13.
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requirements of IAEA safeguards and those of verifying a
Chemical Weapons Convention further support the concept of a
permanent UN verification regime.
41
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ANALOGY
As an institution that has carried out the challenging
verification and compliance provisions of the multilateral
Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is natural to examine the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a possible
institutional model for a chemical weapons verification
regime. Certain political, organizational, financial, and
technical aspects of the IAEA might be applied to the
establishment of a CWC verification regime. Additionally,
some of the problems experienced by the IAEA may emerge in the
Chemical Weapons Convention. These problems, including the
general sense of dissatisfaction by some member states over
disparity of verification provisions, can offer valuable
lessons for the CWC.
However, critical differences between the IAEA and the CWC
exist that limit the applicability of these lessons.
Requirements to monitor nuclear materials and halt nuclear
proliferation are distinct in many ways from those needed to
verify a complete ban on chemical weapons. Among the most
important of these differences are the immense size and
diversity of the chemical industry. Verification and data
exchange requirements under a comprehensive CWC agreement will
subject many thousands of chemical plants to some form of
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international safeguards. In contrast, the IAEA monitors less
than 1,000 nuclear installations worldwide. 67
This chapter briefly describes the background of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards program and
its purpose in controlling the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Next, differences between controlling chemical and nuclear
weapons are presented. Those differences include the scope of
the problem for verifying the CWC . The chapter concludes with
CWC-applicable lessons from the IAEA experience, including
potential problems areas.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM
The International Atomic Energy Agency was created in
1957 . First proposed by President Eisenhower in his December
1953 "Atoms for Peace" address, the IAEA was established to
promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy by the United
States and other countries with atomic capabilities. 68 The
IAEA was designed as an autonomous body. Required to report
annually to the United Nations General Assembly, it is neither
James F. Keeley, International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying A Chemical
Weapons Convention
,
(Ottawa, Canada: The Arms Control and
Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, 1988),
14.
68 Dupuy, Documentary History of Arms Control , 3 58,397.
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a specialized agency nor a branch of the United Nations. 69
As expressed in Article II of its Statute, specific objectives
of the IAEA are to:
seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the
world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose. 70
However, it was not until ten years after its creation
that the IAEA was called upon to perform specific verification
roles in a multilateral treaty.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 directed the
IAEA to carry out exclusive NPT verification duties under the
Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's Safeguards Programme. In
part, the objectives of the IAEA safeguards are: "the timely
detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or
purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk
of early detection." 71
Ben Sanders, "Some Practical Aspects of Arms Control
Verification, " in Multilateral Aspects of the Disarmament
Debate
,
(United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs,
1989), 149.
70 Ibid., 397
71 The Structure and Content of Agreements between the
Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , INFCIRC/153, IAEA,
Vienna, May 1971, para. 28 in Krass, Verification: How Much is
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Unfortunately, three limitations on safeguards can be
derived from that statement of purpose. First, safeguards
apply to "peaceful nuclear activities" and therefore do not
include military nuclear facilities of the declared nuclear
weapon states. Second, safeguards are intended to deter the
diversion of nuclear materials, not prevent them. 72 Third,
the IAEA and its safeguard system lack an enforcement
mechanism to modify the behavior of member states should the
need arise. Lacking such enforcement powers, safeguards can
only serve to deter the diversion of nuclear materials by
threatening to expose improper activities.
Despite those admitted drawbacks, the IAEA verification
system represents substantial advances in co-operative arms
control agreements. Notable features include the ability of
the IAEA to function as a verification agency dedicated to
standardization and coordination of an international
safeguards system. This multinational system, designed to
represent both nuclear suppliers and recipients, has proved
more politically acceptable than multiple bilateral systems
which often result in conflicting approaches to the assigned
verification task. 73
Enough? , 89-90.
Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? , 90.




A second attribute of the IAEA is its success in the
politically-sensitive area of on-site inspection. Through
development and maturation of its safeguards system, the
Agency has solved many delicate industrial, technical, and
economic issues associated with foreign inspectors on national
territory. That safeguards system, structured not to infringe
unacceptably on national sovereignty and on authorized uses of
nuclear facilities and materials, is regarded as a unique
success in multilateral arms control verification. 74
B. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY VERSUS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY:
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Among the most critical differences between verifying a
Chemical Weapons Convention and verifying the Non-
Prolif eration Treaty are the immense size and diversity of the
chemical industry. Coupled with Third World claims that a CWC
might hamper their emerging chemical industries, disparity of
application between states remains a difficult verification
issue. Compounding these concerns are the holdout states
which choose to remain outside the treaty regime and the
relative ease of clandestine CW production.
1. Diversity of the Chemical Industry
IAEA safeguards are considered a great deal more
straightforward than those which will be required to perform
74 Ibid.
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chemical weapons verification. IAEA safeguards are written
for specific production facilities and directed at one
particular end-use product - nuclear explosives. They are
dependent upon narrowly-defined end-use controls and
accounting procedures.
The effectiveness of supplier controls in the chemical
industry is difficult to assess. 75 That complexity is based
upon the variety of chemical agents and precursors that must
be controlled and the varying degrees that chemical plants
must be monitored. To address those chemical industry control
problems, there has been growing accord that the verification
regime required to monitor the CWC must be supplemented by
some form of ad hoc on-site inspections. 76
Verification trial experiments, held by Australia in
1986, concluded that material accounting alone would not
guarantee illicit production of designated chemicals. 77
Preliminary estimates of the number of chemical facilities
that would have to be inspected in order to verify non-
production range from 50,000 to 100, 000. 78 Though
technically feasible, the magnitude of that inspection task
75 Ibid., 11
Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and
International Trade Canada, The Chemical Weapons Convention






will require a much larger international inspectorate than
that required by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some
studies claim that, even if these inspections are carried out
in a minimal way, this effort would require a major allocation
of resources not necessarily related to the degree of risk
posed to the Convention. 79
The right of challenge inspections, described by
President Bush as the ability of a verification body to go
"anywhere, anytime, and no right of refusal," 80 is one method
to target suspect states and limit verification costs.
However, that politically charged issue, the need for
challenge inspections, has little precedent in multinational
arms control verification. While certain aspects of the IAEA
experience in international inspections are germane to the
CWC, overcoming political barriers to challenge inspections is
an area where the IAEA can provide little guidance.
2. Disparity of Application
A general sense of dissatisfaction with the
implementation of Articles IV and VI of the NPT has been
voiced by many Third World nations. Article IV ensures "the
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination" and Article VI states that parties will pursue
79 Ibid.
Lewis, "U.S. Now Prefers Limited Inspection," Al
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measures to cease "the nuclear arms at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament." 81
Claims that technical assistance is discriminatory,
that supplier group controls infringe upon peaceful nuclear
purposes, and concern over lack of progress in superpower arms
control, have been stated by some developing nations.
Additionally, the disparity of application by requiring non-
nuclear weapon states to submit to safeguards while nuclear
weapon states were not required to do so, has proved to be
another point of Third World criticism. Such charges of
inequity lesson the confidence in the non-proliferation regime
and may lead to negative effects on its component bodies,
including the IAEA safeguards system. 82
Disparity of application in a ban on chemical weapons
is a major concern for many of these same developing nations.
Widespread apprehension that a CWC might place Third World
states at a commercial or industrial disadvantage in
developing their chemical industries is firmly grounded in
their experience with the IAEA. Further, any efforts to deny
chemical weapons to some nations while allowing for retention
by others is also viewed as hypocritical by many Third World
81 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Articles IV and VI, in U.S.
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements , 100.
Lawrence Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the
International Atomic Energy Agency: A Critical Assessment
,
(Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1985), 66-67.
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states. 83 The CWC verification regime must avoid any
speculation that the interests of one state, or group of
states, is provided undue advantage through treaty provisions.
Unlike the IAEA Statutes, the CWC verification regime must
refrain from placing different requirements or levels of
control on party states. Industry cooperation and the
consensus approach to problem solving will assist in this
area
.
3. Non-Member States and Potential Proliferators
Despite the existence of a suitable control system for
either nuclear of chemical regimes, there will always be hard-
core holdouts, states that elect to remain outside the Treaty
system. Whether driven by regional or global ambitions or
conventional security fears, certain nations remain motivated
to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA is not
directly involved with these fundamental issues of power and
security
.
83 In May, 1991, President Bush reversed his position to
retain 2% of U.S. CW stockpiles until all CW-capable nations
had signed the CWC. Previously, U.S. policymakers viewed the
stockpile as a deterrent to CW use against the United States
and as an incentive for other nations to sign the CWC. Many
third world nations believed that U.S. position sought to deny
other nations a CW capability while the U.S. retained chemical
weapons. The United States has now pledged to destroy its
entire chemical weapons stockpile within 10 years of the CWC
coming into force. In Bowman, "Chemical Weapons: Negotiations
and Destruction," 7.
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Currently, there are at least 14 nuclear facilities in
five nations that are not subject to safeguards
inspections. 84 Lacking enforcement provisions, neither the
IAEA or its safeguards system can do anything about these non-
party states or their future decisions to acquire nuclear
weapons. However, one professor of government who has written
extensively on the IAEA concluded:
While the success or failure of U.S. and world
nonprolif eration policy does not stand or fall on the
decision to acquire nuclear weapons by one or two
nonsignatories to the NPT, the strength of the no-weapons
pledge increases each time a new state chooses to make it.
Each additional nonprolif eration pledge reinforces others
and complicates decisions of the remaining nonparticipants
to go against the grain of overwhelming international
ethic. 85
However, non-member states continue to be a source of tension
and concern for the NPT. Also, states that previously
followed the treaty but have become suspect because of their
actions further complicate the treaty regime.
Despite incomplete NPT membership and suspect actions
by some members, the IAEA safeguards system is useful in
complicating the plans of potential prolif erators . Safeguards
create added risks of detection and added trouble and expense
34
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Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? , 231.
Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the IAEA , 3
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for states attempting to circumvent or violate established
procedures , 86
Whatever the control system in place, not all possible
routes of acquisition can be monitored. Clandestine
production and stockpiling are not monitored by the IAEA and
will be difficult to monitor under proposed verification
provisions of the CWC . International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors do not have legal power to issue writs for release
of information or subpoena individuals for statements of their
actions. The transfer of authority to the IAEA is restricted
in a way to leave the legal sovereignty of the State
unaffected by the Agency's jurisdiction. 87
Similar to the experience of the NPT, some nations may
elect not to join a Chemical Weapons Convention.
Additionally, not all routes to chemical weapon acquisition
can be covered in a CWC. Lessons from the IAEA's experience
with non-members (for example, China and North Korea), and
potential prolif erators (Iraq), will show that the decision to
acquire weapons of mass destruction is largely a political one
and must be dealt with separately from verification
provisions
.
Closing political loopholes in a Chemical Weapons
Convention will require actions supplemental to basic CWC
Keeley, International Atomic Energy Safeguards , 17.
87 Bellany, Verification of Arms Control Agreements , 68.
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treaty provisions. These procedures might include unilateral
supplier restraints, "trigger lists" of controlled items and
multinational export control groups - tactics used to
supplement the IAEA safeguards system in the nuclear control
regime
.
C. LESSONS FROM THE IAEA EXPERIENCE
As an arms control verification system applied to
industrial processes, the International Atomic Energy Agency
holds several lessons for the verification of a ban on
chemical weapons . These lessons include the manner in which
the IAEA approached such diverse issues as national
sovereignty, development of a multi-tiered control system to
halt nuclear proliferation and how the IAEA functioned as a
technical organization, void of many political issues which
have plagued other international bodies.
1. Issues of National Sovereignty
The verification role of the IAEA, carried out under
its safeguards program, serves as the premier example of an
international organization involved in multilateral
verification. In the case of the IAEA, verification by an
international organization has proved more acceptable as an
intrusion on national sovereignty than if conducted on a one-
to-one or bilateral basis. By electing to accept IAEA
safeguards, states agreed that an independent, standardized
system of verification was preferable to operating under two
53
or more conflicting systems. 88 Thus, acceptable safeguards
were derived from a balance of adversarial and cooperative
approaches to the nuclear verification task.
One cooperative approach, directly related to issues
of national sovereignty, is the IAEA use of non-intrusive
instrument monitoring systems. From the political-
institutional aspect, passive and remote technologies have
proved more acceptable than costly on-site inspections.
Photography has given way to closed-circuit television and
containment seals have continually improved through the use of
fibre-optics, ultrasonics, and tamper-proof electronics. 89
The IAEA's remote continuous verification (RECOVER) system was
developed to link electronic and fibre-optic probes to on-site
computers, which then transmit data by satellite or telephone
line directly to IAEA headquarters in Vienna. 90
Some political sensitivity has delayed progress in the
area of remote verification. 91 Nonetheless, extensive CWC
verification provisions dictate that chemical verification
requirements be conducted at a cost commensurate with the
threat of non-compliance. Non-intrusive IAEA verification
Keeley, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
,
21.
89 Bellany, The Verification of Arms Agreements , 71-72
Karl Pieragostini , "Arms Control Verification:
Cooperating to Reduce Uncertainty, " The Journal of Conflict
Resolution
, (September 1986): 441.
91 Ibid.
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methods, including the RECOVER system, containment and tagging
systems, and tamper-proof electronics, can be amended to
perform CWC verification duties.
Additionally, as an international organization
representing both suppliers and recipients, the IAEA has
proved to be neutral in its verification role. Safeguarded
states have considered their interests better protected from
within the organization than if they had chosen not to
participate. 92 States which joined the NPT and accepted IAEA
safeguards acquired some degree of influence in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty regime.
That same preference - to work within an organization
to effect desired change - has been aptly demonstrated for the
CWC. In January 1989, 149 states attended the UN-sponsored
Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Wishing to build upon that Conference, in September 1989,
Australia convened a Government -Industry Conference Against
Chemical Weapons. Representatives from 66 countries and non-
governmental organizations attended that Canberra
Conference. 93 The number of potential member states and
competing issues of national sovereignty dictate that CWC
92 Keeley, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
,
21.
93 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook
1989 , 243-46.
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verification provisions be conducted by an international
organization
.
2. Multi-tiered Arrangement Required
Successful verification of the NPT has been
accomplished using a multi-tiered arrangement. The Treaty
contains the basic layer of obligations: it obligates non-
nuclear weapon states to conclude agreements with the IAEA and
makes general mention of safeguards to be applied. These
standard safeguards form the second layer of obligations.
Individual states then negotiate various technical and
administrative subsidiary arrangements pertaining to the
safeguards operation of that state. Beyond that largely
logistical third level is the fourth tier of the arrangement:
the facility attachment. Concluded for each facility under
safeguards, the exact technical nature and specific procedures
to be applied to that installation are determined. 94
A multi-tiered control system for the CWC was
introduced to the Conference on Disarmament by Sweden in
August 1985. Included in that document, CD/632, were
proposals for arranging chemical agents into three groups.
Each group would include four regimes: declarations,
Sanders, "Some Practical Aspects of Verification,"
150.
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elimination, production and verification . 9E> To date, nearly
all serious verification suggestions for a CWC have included
some form of detailed, multi-tiered control system. The
experience and success of the IAEA in the area of multi-level
verification should be useful in negotiating a standardized
system for CWC verification.
3. Avoidance of Politicization Important
The final similarity between nuclear and chemical
control regimes is the degree to which those organizations
must remain free of political conflict. Though no
international agency can operate entirely without political
debate or controversy, the IAEA is often referred to as a
successful technical rather than a political institution. 96
The problem of politicization, the injection of
unrelated political issues and controversies into that
agency's charter97
,
provoked the United States to suspend
temporarily its participation in the IAEA from September 1982
to the spring of 1983. The value of the IAEA and the worth of
the non-proliferation regime proved to be more important than
A. Lau, "A Comprehensive Approach for Elaborating
Regimes for Chemicals in a Future Chemical Weapons
Convention, " in The Chemical Industry and the Projected
Chemical Weapons Convention , Vol.11, by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 116-19.




combating other IAEA members over the condemnation of
Israel. 98
Keeping extraneous political issues from returning to
the IAEA, or preventing them from ever developing in a
chemical weapons verification body, is critical to the
technical success of either organization. The design of the
IAEA as an autonomous agency within the United Nations system
helps to insulate that body from political tensions that
detract from its technical verification duties. Similarly, a
chemical weapons verification agency must retain that same
independent arrangement, affiliated with - but not subordinate
to - the United Nations.
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
While the IAEA may hold many lessons for the CWC, there
are important differences that limit the applicability of
these lessons. Foremost among these potential problem areas
is the difficulty in controlling chemical weapons technology.
Additionally, the CWC includes disarmament provisions, an area
On June 7, 1981, Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear
research reactor at Osirak. Although the reactor was under
IAEA safeguards, the Iraq government had previously announced
that it would refuse inspection of its nuclear facilities
until the war with Iran was ended. That Israeli attack nearly
disrupted the delicate balance between the integrity of IAEA
safeguards and the NPT. More importantly, however, it
demonstrated the need for an international regime to resolve
contentious verification issues if multilateral treaties are
to succeed. In Richard S. Williamson, "The United Nations:
Some Parts Work," Orbis, (Spring 1988): 193.
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untouched by the Statutes of the IAEA. Another difference
centers around the issue of latent proliferation, a major
concern for the CWC not addressed by the IAEA. And finally,
any chemical safeguards system modeled directly after IAEA
methods will be a costly undertaking.
1. Control of Chemical Weapons Technology Difficult
Extension of the safeguards system to the Chemical
Weapons Convention presents one major technological
difference. Unlike the clear delineation of nuclear weapons
states and non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT, there are no
centralized suppliers for chemical weapons technology. The
technological/industrial base and raw materials to produce
chemical weapons exists in a great majority of nations."
At the time the IAEA came into existence, nuclear
reactors were operating or under construction in five
countries. 100 The United States and Soviet Union were able
to negotiate a Non-Proliferation Treaty and enforce a system
of safeguards under the IAEA because they had control of a
technology that other countries wanted and were willing to
make political sacrifices to obtain. 101 In return for
guarantees that nuclear technology would not be misused, the
89
99 Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? , 233.
100 U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements
,
101 Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? , 232
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controllers of nuclear technology agreed that all parties to
the Treaty would "have the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials , and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy". 102 Essentially, states which signed the NPT yielded
on matters of national sovereignty, in the form of the
safeguards system, in order to gain nuclear technology.
Few nations will be enticed to sign a CWC or agree to
a chemical safeguards program by the mere promise of technical
assistance to their chemical industries. Instead, the role of
industry must be to actively participate in the design of the
CWC verification system. By its direct involvement in the
negotiation process, the chemical industry can cooperate in
the efforts to control the spread of chemical weapons while
monitoring industry concerns. These concerns include: the
complexity of the control efforts, potential direct and
indirect costs to industry, protection of confidential
information, and protection of legitimate dual-use
chemicals . 103
2. CWC Includes Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
The current draft of the Chemical Weapons Convention
includes removal of current CW stockpiles, destruction of CW
102 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article IV, para. 2 in U.S
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements , 100.
103 Olson, "Industry Can Live With a CWC," 21.
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production facilities, and end-use control of specified
chemical agents. Thus, when finalized, the CWC will be both
a disarmament and a non-proliferation agreement. While the
Non-Proliferation Treaty called for "cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and to
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective control" 104 , no provisions for nuclear disarmament
were given to the IAEA. Instead, that agency was designed to
control nuclear proliferation through its verification
functions, namely its safeguards system.
Many unique problems can arise for any organization
given dual objectives. For the IAEA, those dual objectives
involve technical assistance and non-proliferation duties.
Some officials have argued that competition between those
competing functions has blurred the objectives and complicated
the structure and functioning of the Agency. 105
To avoid similar charges of blurred objectives, a CWC
verification regime must remain structured around a single,
well-defined purpose. Other functions, including technical
assistance, should be assigned only if they are secondary and
104 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI, in U.S. ACDA,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements , 100.
Keeley, International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards
, 52. The same point is argued in Lawrence
Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World
Nuclear Order
,
(Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
1987) .
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clearly supportive of the primary function - verification of
a complete ban on chemical weapons. 106
However, while detailed specifications for verifying
a CWC are clearly critical for initial implementation, such
rigid provisions may prevent that verification system from
responding to changing problems, techniques or projected
applications. 10 ' To meet these future challenges, the CWC
verification system must be structured to respond to emergent
industry concerns and allow for growth in its technical
verification role. The consensus approach to problem solving
utilized by other UN organizations can best meet these
undetermined technical, financial, and political verification
concerns
.
3. Non-Discriminatory Control Ineffective for CWC
In order to be effective and politically acceptable in
its safeguards program, the IAEA has relied upon a non-
discriminatory system of control. The allocation of
safeguards resources is made according to technical/industrial
criteria. Therefore, safeguards efforts are directed to
states with significant civilian nuclear activities and not
necessarily targeted at states with strong motivations to





acquire nuclear weapons. 10£ Additionally, no effort is made
to single out states that might create the most undesirable
consequences should they acquire nuclear weapons. Any attempt
to base inspection efforts on motivation or consequences would
probably be politically unworkable 109 since IAEA verification
procedures are firmly established in non-discriminatory
methods of control
.
The Chemical Weapons Convention faces an even greater
verification dilemma regarding non-discriminatory inspection
procedures. Based upon the number of chemicals and plant
sites to be monitored, a safeguards system based on the IAEA
model would prove far too costly. Acceptance, to some degree,
of compulsory challenge inspections in the CWC was expected to
resolve the issue of targeting suspect states. However,
recent proposals by the United States to limit challenge
inspections will bring this allocation of resources problem
back to the forefront
.
Linked to the political issue of non-discriminatory
control is the risk of latent proliferation. By preserving
access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, the
IAEA intentionally has not addressed the problem of latent




make nuclear explosives. 110 A latent proliferation approach
to controlling chemical weapons may be very difficult because
of the relatively simple process required to produce these
weapons. The sheer number of chemical plants and widespread
availability of potential suppliers and materials make latent
proliferation a major concern for the CWC
.
Conclusion of a treaty to ban chemical weapons depends
greatly on the government -industry approach to latent
proliferation. Thus far, government-industry cooperation in
pursuing a CWC has been encouraging. At the Government
-
Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, hosted by
Australia in September 1989, some 400 delegates from 60
nations met to discuss chemical weapons policies. According
to one conference official:
the U.S. chemical manufacturing industry, represented by
the Chemical Manufacturing Association (CMA) has been
aggressive in setting the chemical weapons arms control
agenda. In some senses, the CMA has been way ahead of the
United States. 111
Although the problems of supplier controls are
magnified for chemical weapons, some specific control efforts
of the NPT should be adapted for possible chemical industry
use. These control lessons include: methods of development of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its successful "trigger list"
110 Ibid., 6-9.
111 Olson, "Industry Can Live With a CWC," 25
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of nuclear export control items; the manner in which the IAEA
protects proprietary information and does not penalize
developing countries or their nuclear industries; and the
extensive use of industry when determining verification
methods and controls.
4. Spiraling Costs of Safeguards
To perform the verification duties assigned by the
NPT, considerable emphasis has been placed upon the safeguards
system of the IAEA. That emphasis is best demonstrated by the
growth of the Safeguards Division staff and budget. In 1967,
total division staff was 24 members. That staff performed 29
inspections, with total expenditures amounting to $400,000 -
4% of the total IAEA budget. The safeguards operation in 1986
involved 455 members who performed 2050 inspections. That
year, the Safeguards Division budget was nearly $40 million
and accounted for over 35% of the total IAEA budget. 112
To meet the demands of improved nuclear technology -
extending the safeguards system to cover a ban on plutonium or
enriched uranium - substantive changes would have to be made
to the present system. Though feasible, the development,
elaboration and codification of these technical measures, the
recruitment and training of additional staff, and the re-




negotiation of every safeguard agreement concluded since 1970,
make this a tedious and costly undertaking. 113
An extension of the safeguards system to the CWC
raises similar financial concerns. With initial estimates for
annual CWC verification costs ranging from $15 million to $300
million (see Chapter III above) , budget increases on the
magnitude of the IAEA would make a CWC verification regime far
too costly. Financing the CWC verification regime remains an
unresolved and highly contentious issue.
E. SUMMARY
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been praised as
an international organization widely accepted in the field of
peaceful nuclear technology. Whereas the experience of the
IAEA is specifically structured for the monitoring of nuclear
materials, many of its lessons can be applied to the
establishment of a chemical weapons verification regime.
In its 30-year history, the IAEA has successfully faced
many difficult political and technical verification issues.
These successes include the manner in which the IAEA resolved
quarrelsome issues of national sovereignty, avoided
politicization within its organization and simultaneously
operated on four verification levels to control nuclear
proliferation
.
113 Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? , 231-32
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Obviously, the CWC will present many unique verification
challenges. The requirement to monitor a wide variety of
substances, many with dual uses, presents a difficult test for
the chemical industry and adds to the verification dilemma.
Challenge inspections over allegations of CW use or
clandestine production are problems now facing the CWC
verification regime for which there is little international
precedent. The problems of latent proliferation and non-
discriminatory control, unresolved by the IAEA, are critical
issues still confronting the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Thus, the use of the International Atomic Energy Agency as
a model for the chemical weapons verification regime should be
approached carefully. Organizational characteristics,
political and technical innovations, and finances of the IAEA
cannot be transferred mechanically to a Chemical Weapons
Convention. 114 However, the success of the IAEA as an
international organization should reveal that, despite some
setbacks, the benefits of that organization far outweigh the
consequences should it cease to exist. Where applicable, the
chemical weapons verification regime should draw upon the vast
verification experiences of the IAEA and its successful
safeguards program.




V. UN ROLE IN VERIFICATION OF IRAQI CW CAPABILITIES
On 2 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council
drafted Resolution 687 which declared provisions for a cease-
fire in the Persian Gulf war. In part, that resolution
mandated the formation of a UN Special Commission to inspect,
destroy, remove or render harmless Iraq's chemical and
biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles and nuclear-
weapons-grade material. 115
Although the work of the commission remains unfinished,
comparable lessons from the verification and destruction of
Iraq's chemical weapons might be applied to the larger task of
verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention.
However, the chemical disarmament of Iraq is a unique
arms control effort. Under the provisions of Resolution 687,
sweeping latitude has been provided to the UN Special
Commission to allow it to carry out its duties. Moreover, the
commission is receiving crucial intelligence data from the
United States and enjoys an allied guarantee of protection
against Iraqi interference.
United Nations, Security Council, "Excerpts From
Draft U.N. Council Resolution on the Cease-Fire in the Gulf."
In The New York Times , 3 April 1991, p. A7 .
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Nonetheless, by promoting the establishment of the UN
Special Commission in Iraq, n6 the United States acknowledged
that a limited verification role does exist for the United
Nations. This chapter examines the formation of that UN
Special Commission as a possible model for a permanent UN
verification regime. The ability of the commission to obtain
qualified inspectors, equipment and funding, and to design a
suitable plan of action within established timeframes is
investigated. Similarities and dissimilarities between the
verification of Iraqi chemical disarmament and requirements to
verify a Chemical Weapons Convention are then presented.
Finally, the performance of the commission is evaluated to
determine if this limited UN verification role is reason for
the United States to revisit its opposition to a permanent UN
verification regime.
A. FORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION
Resolution 687 has been characterized as the most complex
and ambitious effort ever attempted by the United Nations to
settle a war and punish an aggressor. 117 The plan mandated
116 Twelve of the Security Council's 15 members voted in
support of the measure. Cuba was the only negative vote.
Yemen and Ecuador abstained. In Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes Stern
Conditions for Formally Ending War; Iraqi Response Uncertain,
"
The New York Times , 4 April 1991, p.AlO.
117 Paul Lewis, "UN Security Council Drafts Plan To Scrap
Most Deadly Iraqi Arms," The New York Times , 27 March 1991, p.
Al.
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the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons, banned all military sales to its armed forces
indefinitely, and ordered Iraq to pay for damages resulting
from the 1990 annexation of Kuwait. It required Iraq to
declare the locations, amounts and types of all dangerous
weapons and related subsystems within 15 days of resolution
adoption. Within 45 days of the resolutions ' s adoption, the
Secretary General was directed to form a special commission to
carry out the on-site inspection and eventual destruction of
these weapons. Within 120 days of passage, the Secretary
General, in consultation with the Special Commission, was
charged to develop a plan for future monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance. To help determine Iraq's
nuclear capabilities and compliance, the director general of
the International Atomic Energy Agency was requested to assist
the Special Commission. 118
UN disarmament specialist Derek Boothby stated that the
inventory and destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons is "the
most difficult" 119 aspect of the Special Commission's
assignment. Chemical weapons "are difficult to handle, there
United Nations, "Excerpts form Draft UN Resolution,"
p. A7 .
119 Jonathan C. Randal, "UN Experts Set to Inspect Iraq's
A-Sites: Visit is First Step in Arms Destruction," The
Washington Post , 16 May 1991.
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are more of them and they are extremely difficult to
destroy," 120 Boothby said.
On 18 April 1991, Iraq sent an inventory of all its
weapons of mass destruction to the United Nations. Regarding
chemical weapons and capabilities, Iraq declared 11,000
chemical munitions, including 6,920 120mm rockets, 2,530 nerve
agent missile warheads, 200 nerve agent bombs, and 725 tons of
nerve agent and 280 tons of mustard gas in bulk storage. 121
At least 2,700 of those weapons were declared buried under the
debris from allied attacks on chemical weapons
storehouses. 122 However, Iraq refused to disclose the
location of 48 pounds of enriched uranium unless the IAEA
guaranteed that it would not be destroyed. 123
Although Iraq partially complied with Resolution 687 by
declaring the size and location of its chemical arsenal,
Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Alexander Watson
charged that Iraqi officials have been relocating CW
stockpiles to avoid their detection. The Iraqi government
denied those charges. 124 Nevertheless, Chairman of the UN
120 Ibid.
121 Bowman, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation," 2.
Elaine Sciolino, "Defanging Iraq: The Dauntingly
Expensive Task of Imposing Arms Control," The New York Times
,
28 April 1991.
R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Withholding Location of
Nuclear Material," The Washington Post , 1 May 1991.
124 Bowman, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation," 2.
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Special Commission Rolf Ekeus admitted that "It is a bigger
and bigger problem the more you look into it." 125 Robert L.
Galluci, the commission's vice chairman, agreed that the
chemical destruction effort is a "significant technical and
political challenge." 126 Both officials acknowledge that
major hurdles exist in the speedy destruction of Iraq's
chemical arsenal . Those obstacles include an immediate lack
of equipment, funds and personnel. Further, they believe
"that the technical, political and environmental problems
could easily delay completion of their work for a year or
more." 127 Janne E. Nolan, a fellow at the Brookings
Institution in Washington, elaborated on the ad hoc nature of
the UN's extraordinarily ambitious task of verifying Iraqi
disarmament
:
When the United States and Soviet Union decide to
eliminate weapons, it involves years of planning and every
single detail and legal nicety is spelled out in thick
briefing books. This time, we're just winging it. 128
125 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Destroying Iraq's Chemical Arsenal




128 Sciolino, "Defanging Iraq," 28 April 1991.
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B. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IRAQI CW DISARMAMENT AND THE CWC
Skeptics may argue that there are limited parallels
between Iraq's post-war disarmament and those of other arms
control regimes. Resolution 687 was imposed by the United
Nations on a country that had just suffered a devastating
military defeat. Its provisions are markedly different from
other arms control regimes where member nations voluntarily
accept certain restrictions and agree to abide by established
rules of inspection.
Nevertheless, some similarities do exist between Iraqi
chemical disarmament and verification provisions of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. These similarities include: the
sheer magnitude of the chemical inspection effort, the
demonstrated ability of a nation to conceal CW production and
stockpiles, and the decision to utilize an international
inspection team to monitor both chemical weapon destruction
and ongoing compliance.
1. Magnitude of the CW Inspection and Destruction Effort
Despite the sweeping latitude provided the UN Special
Commission, Iraq's limited cooperation in the nuclear arena is
the first illustration of how difficult the entire cease-fire
disarmament process will be. Further, that limited
cooperation raises the question of whether Iraq's declared
chemical capabilities can be believed. Iraq claimed that all
16 chemical weapons research and production sites were
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destroyed by allied bombing. However, U.S. government
analysts estimate that Iraq is secretly harboring tons of
additional chemical agents. 129 The UN Special Commission is
responsible for finding and destroying those declared and
undeclared stockpiles.
The enormity of the Iraqi chemical inspection effort
is best demonstrated in terms of required manpower and
estimated destruction costs. The first UN-organized
inspections of suspected and confirmed chemical weapon plants
are likely to last more than one month and require up to 2 00
experts to complete. 130 Once the inspections are completed,
the commission must then evaluate several different methods of
destroying the weapons. Options range from open pit burning -
the quickest and least costly method - to constructing a
chemical weapons destruction plant in Iraq.
Initial indications from the commission chairman are
that the open pit method "will not be possible due to the
environmental and health consequences." 131 Destruction plant
operations range from using portable destruction facilities
borrowed from the United States, Soviet Union or Canada to
building a central destruction facility in Iraq. 132 U.S.






Army officials familiar with the U.S. chemical weapon furnace
on Johnston Atoll estimate that construction of a medium size




However, other estimates to construct a site to
destroy Iraqi chemical weapons according to strict
environmental standards have been placed in the billions of
dollars. 134 These higher estimates may be more correct if
recent problems at the U.S. facility on Johnston Atoll are any
indication of chemical weapon destruction plant reliability.
During tests, the Army reported that the Johnston Atoll
incinerator leaked trace amounts of chemicals into the air and
failed to function 80 percent of the time. On days it
operated, the facility destroyed only 50 rockets - far from
the designed specifications of 192 rockets per day. 135
The pending destruction of Iraq's chemical armaments
and chemical agents has reinforced many of the concerns
associated with verifying a CWC and subsequent destruction of
chemical stockpiles. The required size of the Iraqi
inspection effort, environmental considerations and
133 Ibid.
134 Sciolino, "Defanging Iraq," 28 April 1991.
Keith Schneider, "U.S. Plan to Burn Chemical Weapons
Stirs Public Fear: Delays and Costs Grow, " The New York Times ,
29 April 1991, p. Al
.
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exorbitant destruction costs underscore the wide range of
verification obstacles still facing the CWC
.
2. Ability to Conceal Production and Location
Before the Persian Gulf war, U.S. intelligence experts
estimated that Iraq was producing chemical weapons from three
known sites. Two other sites were suspected of having
production capabilities. After the war Iraq reported 16
chemical weapon research and production sites were destroyed
by allied bombing. In initial post-war assessments the
Pentagon agreed that all Iraqi chemical sites were
destroyed. 13 ' However, subsequent information provided by an
Iraqi defector revealed that Iraq's weapons programs were far
more extensive than original estimates. Less than one month
after Iraq's initial declaration of stockpiles, Baghdad
admitted that it had substantially more chemical weapons than
declared. 137
Intelligence shortcomings on Iraq's chemical
capabilities raises important considerations for the CWC.
Even against the threat of renewed military options, the
Iraqis have withheld information or access to sites and
materials. Additionally, repeated attempts by Iraq to conceal
information about their weapons programs and the size of their
136 Sciolino, "Defanging Iraq, " 28 April 1991
Paul Lewis, "UN Aides Say Iraq May Be Concealing
Nuclear Material," The New York Times , 15 June 1991, p. Al
.
76
chemical arsenals raises serious concerns about other
suspected chemical weapon states. Potential CWC member
states, including Libya, North Korea and South Africa might
also be unwilling to cooperate when challenged to reveal
chemical weapons information. The case of Iraq demonstrates
that even intrusive on-site inspection and the threat of force
cannot fully deter a state from chemical proliferation.
Further, the size of the Iraqi chemical arsenal raises
the serious question of how chemical arms control can be
conducted with countries that may not possess the political
will to help. 138 While there is no easy answer to that
question, Iraq's extensive chemical capabilities demonstrate
the need for continued emphasis on supplier controls in the
CWC to supplement the political will of nonproliferation by
member states.
3. Use of International Body to Monitor Compliance
Possibly the most important precedent in the entire
Iraqi disarmament process was the decision to utilize the
United Nations to conduct actual weapons destruction. Though
assigned many verification duties in the past, never before
has that international body been charged with destroying
weapons
.
Despite Iraq's acceptance of the United Nations as the
international body to locate and destroy its weapons of mass
138 Sciolino, "Defanging Iraq, " 28 April 1991
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destruction, Iraq's initial response to Resolution 687 was one
of severe resistance. Iraqi officials argued that proposed
inspections of its military and scientific installations by an
international commission were extreme infringements upon its
sovereignty and endangered Iraq's national security.
It was not until 19 May 1991, when the Security
Council threatened to suspend the cease-fire arrangement, that
Iraq agreed to the demands of the Special Commission. Iraq
agreed to grant the inspectors immediate access to any site or
factory they wanted to check. The commission was also granted
the right to take materials and chemical samples out of the
country for analysis, to conduct aerial inspection and to
question Iraqi officials about their work on demand. 139
Although Iraq eventually accepted the demands of the
UN-backed commission, its compliance with those demands can be
depicted as less than forthcoming. A spokesman for the
commission, Johan Molander, stated that Iraq has not
cooperated in any of the major areas but has cooperated, to a
small extent, in the search for chemical and biological
weapons. He believes that Iraq is concerned with the
deteriorating stability of those weapons and would prefer
their destruction. 140
Paul Lewis, "Iraq Accepts UN System for Weapons
Inspection," The New York Times , 18 May 1991. p. Al
.
Paul Lewis, "UN Says Iraq Stalls on Arms," The New
York Times , 12 September 1991.
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Another possible explanation for Iraq's limited
cooperation regarding chemical and biological capabilities,
but not nuclear, could be related to the amount of investment
in those individual programs. The Iraqis are unwilling to
cooperate in the search for nuclear-related data and materials
because of the tremendous amount of capital invested in that
area. On the other hand, their chemical weapons capabilities
were relatively inexpensive to obtain and could be easily and
cheaply reconstituted in the future.
Nonetheless, while the inspection effort can be
characterized as a game of cat-and-mouse between members of
the commission and Iraqi officials, much has been discovered
about Iraqi capabilities and many weapons have been destroyed.
Through the development and performance of the UN Special
Commission in Iraq, the UN Security Council has established
an important precedent for the United Nations in arms control
verification and weapons destruction. This precedent should
not be overlooked by the Chemical Weapons Convention because
the CWC is the first global treaty that includes both
disarmament and destruction provisions.
C. DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN IRAQI CW DISARMAMENT AND THE CWC
The nation of Iraq was summarily defeated in the Persian
Gulf war. In order to guard against future acts of Iraqi
aggression, sweeping post-war disarmament and verification
provisions were supported by the United Nations Security
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Council and included in Resolution 687. The intrusive nature
of those provisions, including provisions for future ongoing
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance, is
unprecedented in the history of the United Nations. The
defeated status of Iraq, allied threats to renew military
action to gain inspection concessions and the reliance of the
Special Commission on externally provided intelligence data
make Iraqi chemical disarmament decidedly unique.
1 . Defeated Status of Iraq
Throughout the post-war disarmament process, Iraq has
attempted to frustrate the work of the commission and prevent
them from completing their task. Iraq proposed limitations on
the inspection conditions which sought to prohibit aerial
photography, restrict UN flights from certain locations, place
time limits on inspections and require the placement of Iraqi
officials on board all flights. All of these proposals were
denied by the Security Council.
Detailed provisions outlining Iraq's long-term
compliance are expected to be finalized shortly. The draft
resolution requires Iraq to report on a range of scientific,
industrial and military activities and to submit reports on
those actions to the United Nations. The resolution also
provides for the continuance of highly intrusive inspections
to guard against cheating by allowing indefinite freedom of
travel for UN inspection teams and the right to enter all
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buildings and sites to remove forbidden materials. In short,
the resolution details the price Iraq must pay in national
sovereignty as a result of its defeat following the invasion
of Kuwait. 141
Iraqi efforts to ease tough rules on intrusive
verification and on-site inspections bear some resemblance to
a recent U.S. policy reversal on challenge inspections in the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Instead of granting
international inspectors an immediate right of access to
challenged sites, the United States now proposes managed
access to sensitive civilian and military installations. 142
The United States government claims there are
substantive differences between insistence on complete access
to Iraqi sites and other inspection regimes. Administration
officials assert that Iraq has repeatedly violated its pledge
to open its sites to inspections as mandated in Resolution
687. Additionally, Iraq has concealed weapons, provided
inaccurate weapons data and denied that certain weapons ever
existed. As a result, intrusive inspections are required to
ensure Iraq's compliance with the resolution. 143
141 Paul Lewis, "Allies to Detail Ban on Iraqi Arms: UN
is Expected to Approve Proposal to Enforce Curbs Accepted by
Baghdad," The New York Times , 9 October 1991, p. A6
.
142 Lewis, "U.S. Now Prefers Limited Inspection," p. Al
.
143 Ibid.
2. Rattling the Saber: The Allied Threat of Force
On 26 September 1991, based upon the findings of the
UN Special Commission and other intelligence sources, U.S.
administration officials declared Iraq's nuclear, chemical and
biological programs to be currently dormant. However,
destruction of those weapons remains incomplete and Iraq still
maintains the potential and desire to rebuild those
capabilities . 144
To attain even this limited level of cooperation with
UN inspection teams, allied forces have repeatedly threatened
military intervention against the Iraqi government. In a
letter to Congress, President Bush warned: "The United States
will not tolerate the continuation of this situation, and if
necessary will take action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the
Council's decisions so as to fully implement Resolution 687 's
call for the restoration of international peace and security
to the Middle East." 145 Others, including Senator D'Amato,
Republican of New York, support that use of force. He urged
President Bush to:
deliver another message to Saddam Hussein: 'If you force us to
commit troops to Iraq again, this time things will be
144 Michael Wines, "U.S. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast
Iraqi Atom Program," The New York Times , 27 September 1991, p.
A6.
145 George Bush, "Text of Letter From Bush: 'Deception
and Concealment'," The New York Times , 19 September 1991, p.
A8.
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different. This time, they'll be sent to bring you back dead
or alive. ,146
The allied resolve to enforce Resolution 687 by resort
to military force highlights the distinct difference between
chemical verification in post-war Iraq and verification
requirements of the CWC . Verification provisions of a
Chemical Weapons Convention will unlikely include the threat
of force for non-compliance.
3. Externally Provided Intelligence Data
The final major dissimilarity between Iraqi chemical
disarmament and the CWC involves the reliance of the UN
inspection teams on externally provided intelligence data.
United Nations inspection teams in Iraq received U.S.
reconnaissance satellite photographs of nuclear enrichment
equipment being covertly stored at weapons sites, locating
data from U.S. Global Positioning Satellites, and particularly
useful weapons information from at least three Iraqi civilian
engineer defectors. 147 Additionally, U.S. provided satellite
photographs revealed the movement of sensitive equipment,
hidden in garages and moved aboard trucks at night, and by one
account, the burying of chemical weapons containers in
146 Andrew Rosenthal, "U.S. Warns Iraqis It May Use Force
To Inspect Arms," The New York Times , 19 September 1991, p.
Al.
147 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraqis Tried to Deceive UN Nuclear
Inspectors," The Washington Post , 29 June 1991, p. A16.
graveyards. 148 When surprised by disclosures that Iraq
continued prohibited weapons research, the UN Special
Commission requested U-2 flights be flown by the United States
to assist the commission with its aerial reconnaissance
efforts. 149
Despite this precedent of sharing allied intelligence
data with United Nations inspectors, it is difficult to
estimate any future level of cooperation regarding sensitive
intelligence methods and information. Clearly, challenge
inspections within the CWC may arise based upon national
technical methods (NTM) of intelligence gathering. However,
the extent that a nation may choose to reveal its NTM
capabilities or share that data is uncertain.
Currently, there are no provisions for the CWC
verification regime to rely upon member-nation NTM
intelligence data. However, supplemental NTM intelligence
information was crucial to the success of the UN commission in
Iraq. That extensive use of U. S . -provided NTM intelligence
data can serve as a valuable lesson for the CWC. Verification
provisions of the CWC must address the many delicate issues
encountered when sensitive intelligence data is used to
challenge treaty compliance. Additionally, the demonstrated
reliance by the commission on that NTM data establishes a need
148 Wines, "U.S. is Building Up a Picture," p. A6
.
Jerry Gray, "UN Using U.S. Spy Planes to Monitor
Iraqi Arms," The New York Times , 13 August 1991.
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for the CWC to incorporate the use of NTM in monitoring
compliance
.
D. AD HOC COMMISSION REASON TO REVISIT OPPOSITION TO UNVA?
Although Iraq initially conceded to all provisions of
Resolution 687, the inspection process has been likened, at
times, to the comic tenor of a Keystone cops film. 15,0
Increasingly, the Iraqis have balked at the provisions of the
gulf war cease-fire. Iraqi officials have failed to fully
disclose weapons data, moved and concealed equipment they
claimed did not exist, fired shots at and detained UN
inspectors and attempted repeatedly to place restrictions on
the inspection effort.
Despite these provocative tactics, the Iraqis have
ultimately agreed to all allied and special commission
inspection demands. The stern measures of Resolution 687
underscore the advantageous bargaining position of the United
Nations Security Council. Diplomatic and military pressures
applied by the United Nations and victorious allied countries
have guaranteed a slow yet ongoing Iraqi disarmament process.
Assisted at times by outside intelligence sources and
supported, when necessary, by the threat of allied armed
John E. Yang and John M. Goshko, "Bush Says Iraq
Violates Cease-Fire: Pentagon Preparing Range of Options, " The
Washington Post , 29 June 1991, p. Al
.
force, the commission has functioned well in the inspection
and destruction of Iraqi arms.
Unfortunately, the issue of funding weapons destruction
remains unresolved. On 19 September 1991, Security Council
Resolution 706 authorized the sale of up to $1.6 billion of
Iraqi oil. Under strict UN supervision, $1 billion worth of
oil revenues would be used for food, medicine and other
essential civilian needs for the Iraqi people. The remaining
portion of those proceeds would be distributed to the Kuwaiti
Compensation Fund and to pay costs incurred by the Special
Commission in their efforts to find and destroy Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction. To date, Iraq has rejected the UN plan,
calling it another intolerable insult to the country's
sovereignty. UN officials believe Iraq will eventually start
selling the oil, just as it has eventually accepted all the
Council's Gulf war resolutions after first denouncing them and
refusing to cooperate.
However, if Iraq refuses to release control of that oil to
the United Nations, the question remains: Who will pay the
costs of destroying Iraq's weapons? The United Nations cannot
absorb those exorbitant costs under present dues and
assessments and voluntary contributions may not cover all
expenses. No precedent exists for the resolution of such an
expensive undertaking, yet that issue will ultimately have to
be faced. Though not itself a financial solution, a permanent
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UN verification agency could provide the forum for
investigating methods of payment.
It must also be re-stated that the nation of Iraq is
attempting to recover from a resounding military defeat. Its
economy and infrastructure remains in shambles and full
compliance with Security Council Resolution is one important
requirement for the permanent lifting of an Iraqi oil embargo
and removal of strict economic sanctions. Iraq's reluctant
compliance with UN demands demonstrates not only the
uniqueness of this cease-fire disarmament process but the
inherent weakness of imposing arms control on a country bent
on aggression.
Admittedly, the team is performing its duties in an
unusual arms control atmosphere. David Kay, an inspection
team leader detained in Baghdad for four days, remarked of the
precedent the commission might be setting in the area of arms
control. During the standoff between team members and Iraqi
officials, he declared:
We believe that a right of an inspector to conduct an
inspection unfettered by restrictions to collect material,
remove it and analyze it, is essential to any inspection
regime, and at a time in which the world is moving towards
more stable politics, to violate that in a matter of this sort
is something none of us are prepared to do. 151
CNN telephone interview with David Kay, "UN





Unfortunately, broad inspection rights such as challenge
inspection without the right of refusal and "open skies"
aerial reconnaissance are regarded in the international
community as inviolable issues of national sovereignty. In
arms control regimes, the voluntary yielding of such power
ultimately requires prior consent of the state. The yielding
of such rights have not been optional for the state of Iraq.
Thus, the disarmament of Iraq may set a precedent for
imposed arms control regimes while providing limited
usefulness for voluntary arms control verification. While the
disarmament of Iraq may hold organizational and technical
lessons for verification regimes, the imposed nature of its
provisions do not alone justify a U.S. reversal of its
previous opposition to a permanent UN verification agency.
E . SUMMARY
The ad hoc development of the Special Commission to carry
out Iraq's post-war disarmament parallels the U.S. position
for all arms control regimes. That position is centered on
the belief that treaties should be verified on a treaty-
specific basis, as agreed to by the negotiating parties. In
the case of Iraq, the negotiating parties were the UN Security
Council. The Special Commission was established on an ad hoc
basis, by those negotiating parties, for a specific purpose -
to carry out the provisions of Resolution 687.
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As an ad hoc verification body, the commission has
successfully conducted its inspection and destruction duties
without the advantages of an in-place organization. Supported
by the fact that this commission is enforcing imposed
conditions, the unique case of Iraqi disarmament does not
constitute sole reason for the United States to reverse its
position against a permanent UN verification mechanism.
Nonetheless, while the UN Special Commission was quickly
established and has proved successful in its ad hoc tasking,
there may be other equally compelling arguments for a
permanent UN verification body. Foremost among these reasons
is the requirement mandated by Resolution 687 for the future
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. The
indefinite nature of the resolution provides an on-going UN
verification role in Iraq for the United Nations. It would be
prudent to maintain the current level of technical expertise
and capabilities of the Special Commission for this future
task. Start-up costs have been borne and personnel,
equipment, vehicles and logistic channels currently exist to
expand this UN verification assignment to a more permanent
assignment
.
Further, this in-place UN verification body could meet the
on-going requirements of Resolution 687 while continuing to
advance verification and destruction techniques developed in
Iraq for future arms control verification scenarios.
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Expanding the lessons of the Special Commission to a
broader scale, the institutional benefits of an in-place
organization (presented above in Chapter IV) for the
International Atomic Energy Agency might also apply. By
examining additional verification roles for a permanent UNVA,
certain institutional advantages could be utilized for
strengthening other regimes, including the CWC
.
Additionally, the deterrence aspect of the IAEA's
existence should not be overlooked. That organization serves
as a constant reminder to states that nuclear proliferation is
a serious matter. A similar institutional body dedicated to
chemical weapon deterrence does not currently exist for the
CWC. In much the same way the Non-Proliferation Treaty
benefitted from the existence of the IAEA, the Chemical
Weapons Convention might also gain from a permanent
verification institution.
Clearly, the United Nations, through the UN Special
Commission, has become an active participant in arms control
verification and weapons destruction. Many of the lessons
associated with destroying Iraq's chemical weapons will
benefit the Chemical Weapons Convention. A unique opportunity
exists to enhance the role of the United Nations in the field
of arms control verification and establish a permanent
institution dedicated to worldwide deterrence, verification,
and destruction of weapons of mass destruction.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
To successfully conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention, it
is essential to establish a permanent United Nations
verification agency. While the United States currently
opposes a United Nations role in multilateral arms control
verification, successes by the International Atomic Energy
Agency in controlling nuclear weapons and the UN Special
Commission in the disarmament of Iraq demonstrate a need for
the United States to revisit that opposition.
The 30-year history of the International Atomic Energy
Agency confirms that a UN-chartered body can perform difficult
verification duties. The IAEA has successfully overcome many
of the difficult political and technical verification
challenges now confronting the CWC . Certain successes of the
IAEA, including the resolution of complex issues of national
sovereignty, avoidance of politicization within the
organization and a demonstrated ability to operate on a multi-
tiered level to stem nuclear proliferation, are directly
applicable to verifying a ban on chemical weapons.
Despite some critical differences between verifying a
Chemical Weapons Convention and verifying the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, important lessons from the IAEA exist
for the proper structuring of a permanent verification agency.
Among the most critical differences are the immense size and
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diversity of the chemical industry and the relative ease of
production of chemical weaponry.
Clearly, these differences prohibit a simple expansion of
the IAEA to handle the distinct verification requirements of
a CWC . However, those differences can be used to identify
potential weaknesses in the Convention. Increased reliance on
supplier controls and the need to avoid any perception of
disparity of application among treaty members are important
lessons for the CWC derived from IAEA experiences.
Additionally, the CWC is explicitly lacking an in-place
organization to strengthen the broad norm against chemical
proliferation, an important function of deterrence provided by
the IAEA within the Non-Prolif eration Treaty system.
While the International Atomic Energy Agency is a proven
example of the United Nations' importance in global arms
control verification, the central role played by the United
Nations in the post-war disarmament of Iraq illustrates the
emerging importance of that organization in regional arms
control verification.
The formation of the Special Commission to inspect and
destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is an unprecedented
role for the United Nations in the field of verification. By
promoting the establishment of that commission, the United
States acknowledged that a limited verification role does
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indeed exist for the United Nations. Arguably, the
development of that commission parallels the U.S. position for
treaty-specific verification. It was created by the Security
Council for a specific verification role - the post-war
disarmament of Iraq. However, the indefinite nature of
Resolution 687 and the requirement for future monitoring of
certain provisions establishes a permanent nature to that ad
hoc tasking.
Obviously, the rigid provisions imposed on Iraq by
Resolution 687 are markedly different from most arms control
regimes. Nonetheless, both technical and political lessons
emerge from Iraq's chemical disarmament for possible use by
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
First, attempts at concealment and resistance to the
inspection process highlight the magnitude of a global
chemical weapons inspection and destruction process. Second,
the demonstrated ability by one nation to conceal CW
production and maintain large chemical stockpiles focuses
attention on the need for on-site inspection and continued
emphasis on supplier controls in the CWC . Finally, an
important precedent was established with the decision to
utilize the United Nations to conduct actual weapons
destruction. Although the United Nations has performed many
verification duties in the past, never before have those
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duties included the destruction of weapons. This precedent is
extremely important to the Chemical Weapons Convention because
it may be the first global treaty that includes both
disarmament and destruction provisions.
The United Nations, with its universal membership and
broad experience in the field of disarmament, has an important
role to play in the verification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. This thesis examines the degree to which two UN-
affiliated bodies, the UN Special Commission in Iraq and the
IAEA, accomplished their assigned arms control duties for
possible applicability to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
While many similarities existed at the organizational level,
many crucial dissimilarities existed at the political and
technical levels. The verification requirements for a
complete ban on chemical weapons are decidedly unique and far
too complicated to allow exact modeling on an established
institution or Special Commission.
However, while exact parallels between these UN
verification roles and the CWC are difficult to conclude, both
cases illustrate a significant role for the United Nations in
the field of arms control and disarmament. Previously, that
step was unimaginable based upon the strained international
political climate.
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Moreover, when the United States cast the single negative
vote against Resolution 43/81 B, a study on the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification, the United States
claimed that the disarmament machinery in the United Nations
needed to be streamlined, not expanded. Additional U.S.
displeasure centered on the ever-increasing UN budget
.
This thesis argues that U.S. resistance to a UN
verification agency was based more on the political and
financial climate which existed in the United Nations during
the late 1980s and less on substantive grounds.
Nonetheless, that political climate within the United
Nations is markedly different today than when the United
States opposed that study. Demonstrating renewed support for
the United Nations, President Bush recently re-stated U.S.
intentions to pay in full annual assessments and to complete
arrearage payments no later than 1995. 152
Admittedly, an improved political climate within the
United Nations does not, by itself, support a reversal of U.S.
opposition to a UN role in arms control verification.
However, in recent years the United Nations has demonstrated
that it can achieve multilateral solutions to difficult
international problems. The rejuvenation of that institution
152 Ibid., 13.
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provides a unique opportunity to advance substantive global
security issues.
Included in those global security concerns is the
completion of a total ban on chemical weapons. The complex
nature of verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, aptly
demonstrated by nearly twenty years of in-depth multilateral
negotiations, is one reason for the United States to examine
its opposition to a permanent UN verification regime.
Potential benefits of a permanent verification agency
presented in this thesis center on the need for sharing
exorbitant verification costs, the unique challenges in
monitoring multinational treaties, and the advantages of an
in-place body to address verification concerns before treaty
implementation and to handle disputes when they occur.
Multilateral treaties like the CWC dictate that arms
control verification be a collective and increasingly
cooperative activity. 1 " 3 Verifying a Chemical Weapons
Convention will require tremendous financial resources and
enhance the need for organizational efficiency and economy.
A permanent UN verification agency could provide the forum for
coordinating verification resources and advancing new
proposals in arms control verification.
153 F. Ronald Cleminson, "Principles of Verification: The
Multilateral Context," In Multilateral Aspects of the
Disarmament Debate
,
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 1989), 137.
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Regrettably, precise financial comparisons do not exist
between the cost of establishing and operating a permanent UN
verification agency and corresponding costs of continuing to
verify treaties on an ad hoc treaty-by-treaty basis. Despite
the absence of such cost comparisons, estimates for verifying
the OWC and other global treaties demonstrate the need for
burden-sharing and reducing duplication of effort in the
verification of multilateral treaties.
As new multilateral treaties emerge, an umbrella
verification organization, under auspices of the United
Nations, seems the next likely step in the evolutionary
process of the United Nations. That necessary UN role is best
supported in the wording of the final paragraph of General
Assembly Document A/45/372. It is the report of the Group of
Qualified Experts to Undertake a Study on the Role of the
United Nations in the Field of Verification in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 43/81 B of 7 December 1988.
The present international situation provides the right
environment to engender a dynamic multilateralism.
Indeed, the present situation and the complexity of the
problems faced by the international community suggest the
need to develop a system which can cope with the problems
of security and disarmament in a multilateral framework.
The United Nations is unique in its global scope, its
membership and its Charter. The role played by the United
Nations in the recent past in addressing crisis situations
is a sign that it is likely to be called upon in the
coming years to deal with a number of such situations.
With the prospect of greater attention being given to
achieving multilateral agreements on arms limitation and
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disarmament, an enhanced United Nations capability to
assist in verification, with the consent of all States
parties to such agreements, could be a significant
contribution to international security and co-
operation . 154
Despite its negative vote, the United States participated
in that study. The time is appropriate for the United States
to reexamine its opposition to a permanent UN verification
role. To move forward the Chemical Weapons Convention further
encourages that U.S. policy reversal.
154 United Nations, General Assembly, Verification in All
its Aspects: Study on the Role of the United Nations in the
Field of Verification , A/45/372, 28 August 1990, 87.
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